IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

BARBARA J. FORDE, )
)

Plaintiff, ) CIV 10-01922 PHX MEA
)

v. ) ORDER
)FIRST HORIZON HOME LOAN )CORPORATION, METLIFE HOME )LOANS, BANK OF NEW YORK )MELLON, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC )REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., )QUALITY LOAN SERVICE )CORPORATION, )

)Defendants. ) _____________________________ ) 
All of the parties to this matter have agreed to 
magistrate judge jurisdiction over the proceedings, including 
the entry of final judgment. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s 
motion (Doc. 10) to remand this matter to the state court.1 
On August 3, 2010, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed 
a complaint to quiet title to real property in the Maricopa 
County Superior Court. Plaintiff also alleged Defendants were 
liable to her for monetary damages based on Defendants’ breach 
of contract. The complaint further asserted causes of action 
1 A motion (Doc. 12) to dismiss Quality Loan Service Corporationas a party to this matter and Defendants’ motion to strike (Doc. 8)are also pending. 
based on negligence and fraud. The claims derive from a $650,000 residential home loan to Plaintiff from First Horizon Home Loan Corporation. The complaint filed in state court also sought injunctive relief, i.e., to vacate a substitution of trustee and assignment of deed of trust and Notice of Trustee’s Sale. 
On September 20, 2010, Defendants Metlife Home Loans, Bank of New York Mellon, First Horizon Home Loans, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Incorporated, filed a Notice of Removal in this Court. Defendants assert complete diversity of the parties and the amount in controversy as the sole basis for the Court’s jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Plaintiff in state Superior Court. On September 22, 1010, these Defendants filed a motion to strike the complaint filed in the state Superior Court, citing Rules 8(a)(2) and (d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff filed a motion to remand her suit to the state court on September 24, 2010, arguing that Defendants failed to comply with the technical requirements for removal. Defendants filed a response to the motion to remand (Doc. 13). In her reply to the response to her motion to remand, Plaintiff concedes that Defendants have met the technical requirements for removal, but Plaintiff now contends that the case should be remanded to the state court because of the nature of the causes of action. See Doc. 22. The Court notes that no party to this matter indicates there are or have been federal questions in this matter which would confer jurisdiction on a basis other than diversity. 
The Court concludes judicial economy, fairness, comity, the existence of novel issues under Arizona law, and the necessity for the Court to interpret Arizona state statutes weigh heavily in favor of the Court declining jurisdiction over this matter. Remand at this time will reduce litigation costs and eliminate any need to certify novel state-law issues to the Arizona Supreme Court or speculate how the Arizona Supreme Court would rule on those issues. 
The Court acknowledges that it has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise its jurisdiction. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 1246-47 (1976).  The United States District Courts have an obligation and a duty to decide cases properly before them, and “[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Id., 424 
U.S. at 813, 96 S. Ct. at 1244. However, in certain exceptional circumstances, the Court can and should decline to exercise jurisdiction. “Pragmatic considerations of judicial efficiency, as well as reasons of comity between federal and state courts”, have led the United States Supreme Court to construct several abstention doctrines. Hanlin Grp., Inc. v. Power Auth. of the State of New York, 703 F. Supp. 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
A District Court may abstain from consideration of the merits of a diversity case because of unclear state law. Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500, 61 S. Ct. 643, 644-45 (1941); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. 
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28-29, 79 S. Ct. 1070, 1073-74 (1959). Abstention is also proper when necessary to avoid needless conflict with state administrative procedures. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 1104 (1943). The Court may properly abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction when a similar legal action is pending in state court. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 
U.S. at 817-18, 96 S. Ct. at 1246-47. When the requirements for abstention are present, the District Court’s decision to abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction is a matter within the Court’s discretion. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush, 87 F.3d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Burford abstention 
[T]he Supreme Court has stated that Burfordabstention is appropriate in two situations.First, federal courts should abstain fromdeciding difficult questions of state lawbearing on policy problems of substantialpublic import whose importance transcends theresult in the case then at bar. We should also abstain from the exercise of federal review that would be disruptive of stateefforts to establish a coherent policy withrespect to a matter of substantial publicconcern. 
International Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
The Supreme Court has characterized Burford abstention as appropriate where the “exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814, 96 S. Ct. at 1244. See also Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189, 79 S. Ct. 1060, 1063 (1959). The purpose of Burford abstention is to “avoid resolving difficult state law issues involving important public policies or avoid interfering with state efforts to maintain a coherent policy in an area of comprehensive regulation or administration.” American Disposal Serv., Inc. v. O’Brien, 839 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988). See also City of Tucson v. U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc., 284 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). The propriety of Burford abstention may be raised sua sponte. See, e.g., National Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 789 F.2d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 1986); Chandler v. Omnicare/The HMO, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 187, 189-90 (D.N.J. 1990). 
While District Courts may abstain from hearing a matter to avoid interfering with complex state administrative processes, abstention is not required “whenever there exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a ‘potential for conflict’ with state regulatory law or policy.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2515 (1989). Moreover, a District Court should not abstain merely because there are complex and difficult issues of state law involved in the controversy before it. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236, 64 S. Ct. 7, 12 (1943). 
When deciding whether to invoke Burford abstention the Court must consider the underlying rationale of administrative abstention. Federal courts evaluating the wisdom of abstaining pursuant to Burford have considered whether the case before the court is based on federal or state law; the degree of specificity of the state regulatory scheme at issue; the necessity of discretionary interpretation of state statutes to resolve the matter; and whether the subject matter of the litigation is traditionally one of state concern. See, e.g., Wilson v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 8 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1993); Bethphage Lutheran Serv., Inc. v. Weicker, 777 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (D. Conn. 1991). Abstention in a diversity matter is warranted when the state has concentrated suits involving the local issue in a particular court; the federal issues are not easily separated from complicated state law issues with which the state courts may have special competence; and federal review might disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 671 (9th Cir. 2004); City of Tucson, 284 F.3d at 1133; United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 705 (9th Cir. 2001). 
The issues involved in this suit, i.e., Defendants’ compliance with state law regarding real property mortgages and foreclosure, are issues subject to specific Arizona statutory and regulatory schemes and involving complex state administrative processes. Because Burford abstention “is concerned with protecting complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference,” Tucker v. First Md. Sav. & Loan, Inc., 942 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court concludes it should abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction over the complaint in this matter. 

Younger Abstention 
The “Younger” doctrine of abstention, which provides that federal courts are not to interfere with pending state criminal proceedings, also applies to civil cases and state administrative proceedings. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. 
v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 2521 (1982); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-05, 95 S. Ct. 1200, 1208 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41, 91 
S. Ct. 748-49 (1971). As with Burford abstention, the Court may raise the issue of Younger abstention sua sponte. See O’Neill 
v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 641-43 (6th Cir. 2008); Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1390-91 (10th Cir. 1996); O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 786 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). 

Under the Younger doctrine, a federal District Court must abstain from hearing a federal case when that case interferes with state judicial proceedings.  Additionally, the District Courts are prevented from enjoining pending state judicial proceedings, absent extraordinary circumstances. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 437, 102 S. Ct. at 2524. Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise any federal claims. See, e.g., Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010). 
It appears that there are on-going state proceedings for the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s real property. Additionally, Arizona has an important interest in resolving real property issues. A ruling on the issues in Plaintiff’s complaint by the Arizona courts implicates the important interest of preserving the authority of the state’s judicial system free from interference by the District Court.  See, e.g., Prindable v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1262 (D. Haw. 2003) (finding foreclosure and ejectment proceedings are important state interests under the Younger doctrine). 
Plaintiff’s complaint raises no potential federal claims. Accordingly, pursuant to Younger and its progeny, the Court should abstain from reaching the merits of this matter. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1528 (1987). 

Rooker-Feldman abstention 
The fact that a foreclosure judgment has been entered against Plaintiff by a state court is sufficient to invoke the doctrine of “Rooker-Feldman” abstention. The District Court should decline jurisdiction over any claims relying on allegations of wrongful foreclosure. 
The doctrine established by the Rooker and Feldman cases essentially holds that the federal District Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by “state-court losers” complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments, or over cases inviting the District Court to review and reject state court judgments. See Exxon Mobil Corp. 
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1522 (2005). The doctrine is generally applied in cases wherein the plaintiff files a suit in the federal court to vacate a state court’s foreclosure. 
The Rooker Feldman doctrine allows federal courts to decline diversity jurisdiction when 
(1) the party in federal court is the same asthe party in state court; (2) the prior statecourt ruling was a final or conclusivejudgment on the merits; (3) the party seekingrelief in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to raise its federal claims inthe state court proceeding; and (4) the issuebefore the federal court was either adjudicated by the state court or was inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment. 
Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1310 n.1 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme 
Court clarified the reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 
S. Ct. 1517 (2005). The Supreme Court carefully prescribed the circumstances in which the doctrine applies: (1) there was a state court action; (2) one party lost; (3) judgment was entered in the state court action against the losing party; (4) the losing party commenced a new action complaining of injuries caused by the state court judgment; and (5) the new action invited the district court to review and reject the state court judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S. Ct. at 1522. 
Citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, in a string of 
recent unpublished decisions the federal courts have uniformly 
determined that federal suits seeking the recision of a mortgage 
loan contract, or alleging that a lender’s malfeasance resulted 
in a foreclosure, belong in the state courts. The courts have 
reached this conclusion even when the plaintiff originates the 
suit in federal court and asserts a claim based on the federal 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). See, e.g., Parker v. Potter, 368 
Fed. App. 945 (11th Cir. 2010); Dempsey v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., 272 Fed. App. 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2008); Jacobowitz v. M 
& T Mortg. Corp., 2010 WL 1063895, at *2 (3d Cir.). See also 
Battah v. ResMAE Mortg. Corp., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2010 WL 
4260530, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
In the context of a state court foreclosure proceeding, Rooker-Feldman prohibits claimsbrought in federal court that may “succeedonly to the extent that the state courtwrongly decided the foreclosure action.”Postma v. First Federal Sav. & Loan of Sioux City, 74 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1996).District courts within the Fourth Circuit have consistently reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Turner v. E. Savings Bank, FSB, No. 09cv2637, 2010 WL 1409858, at*3 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2010); Brumby v. DeutscheBank Nat. Trust Co., No. 1:09cv144, 2010 WL617368, at *3-4 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2010);Lawson v. Allegacy Fed. Credit Union, No.1:08cv832, 2009 WL 3381532, at *2 (M.D.N.C.Oct. 16, 2009); Nott v. Bunson, No. 09cv2613,2009 WL 3271285, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 2009). 
Poindexter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2010 WL 3023895, at *2 
(W.D.N.C.). 

Conclusion 
Given the nature of the Arizona foreclosure process, it is difficult to determine when the rights of the parties regarding the subject residential property are completely determined. The Court is left with a single conclusion based upon alternative doctrines. Because this matter involves evolving issues of state administrative law, the notions of comity and judicial economy implicate Burford abstention. Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court should decline to conduct an appellate-like review over the order authorizing the sale of the real property. Alternatively, if there has been no final determination of the rights of the parties because the foreclosure process has not been concluded, then the Court should abstain under the Younger doctrine. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 10) to remand this matter to state court is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall engage in the process required for remand of this matter to the state Superior Court from which it was removed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the pending motions at Doc. 8 and Doc. 12 are denied without prejudice. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2010. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA OFFICE OF THE CLERK RICHARD H. WEARE RONNIE HONEY 
DISTRICT COURT EXECUTIVE / CLERK OF COURT CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR U. S. COURTHOUSE, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR U. S. COURTHOUSE, 
SUITE 130 Visit our website at www.azd.uscourts.gov SUITE 130 401 WEST WASHINGTON STREET, SPC 1 401 WEST WASHINGTON STREET, SPC 1 PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85003-2118 PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85003-2118 
MICHAEL S. O'BRIEN 
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK EVO A. DECONCINI U.S. COURTHOUSE 405 W. CONGRESS, SUITE 1500 TUCSON, ARIZONA 85701-5010 
December 6, 2010 
Michael Jeanes, Clerk Maricopa County Superior Court 201 West Jefferson Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2205 
RE: Remand to Maricopa County Superior Court 
District Court Case Number: CV10-1922-PHX-MEA Barbara J. Forde v. First Horizon Home Loan Corporation, et al Superior Court Number: CV2010-053734 
Dear Mr. Jeanes: Enclosed is a certified copy of the Order entered in this Court on December 6, 2010, remanding the above case to Maricopa County Superior Court for the State of Arizona. 
Sincerely, RICHARD H. WEARE 
District Court Executive/Clerk
 s/Elaine Leon By: Deputy Clerk Enclosure 
cc: All Counsel of Record Civil Court Administrator 
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